to supply cost-effective improvements in managing patient care; in information gathering and dissemination; and in co-ordinating distributed organizational work [1] . One approach to ensuring resources, staff and systems are allocated and used efficiently is process modelling. A key problem for any highly distributed organization is how to co-ordinate work, and often emphasis is placed upon process-driven arrangements with a high degree of specification of task accompanied by a pervasive rhetoric of standardization.
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This paper presents some findings from the Dependability Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration (DIRC) project, a collaborative six-year research project examining issues of dependability in a number of organizational settings, including hospitals. The aspect of dependability that this paper addresses is that of 'process modelling' as an aspect of managerial activity and the work involved in both creating and implementing process maps or models. Our analysis is based on ethnographic research [2] [3] shadowing hospital managers documenting their everyday activities as they dealt with the creation and implementation of process models. The intention was to standardize as many processes as possible to ensure an identity of service and practice across the distributed operations of the hospital. However, the standardization of any hospital's activities has to be achieved, and, in this case, achieved during a period of major organizational change whereby three hospitals were being united into a single hospital trust. In many cases this involved migrating many of its procedures from the old to the new forms of organization, but in other cases it meant creating standardized procedures anew. Both cases involved various degrees of 'process modelling'.
PROCESS MODELS AND ACTIVITY MONITORING: SOME OBSERVA-TIONS FROM THE FIELD
Hospital management referred to the number of patients treated as 'activity' and discussions highlighted whether or not enough 'activity' was going on. At the time of the fieldwork several strategies were being used to increase 'activity' through better record-keeping. So, for example, the production of process maps was being used to identify bottlenecks in the 'processing' of patients which delayed 'knife to skin' time, or led to the cancellation of treatment. For example, pre-op assessments not being done; or A&E not following standard procedure since they 'don't care' about anything other than the patient, and 
INTRODUCTION
As modern healthcare institutions have become increasingly information intensive, information and communication technologies (ICTs) increasingly play an important role in healthcare delivery and management. Healthcare information systems are intended neglect the required documentation etc. Part of this concern with standardization of practice was because of the introduction of Electronic Patient Records (EPRs), for which standardization appeared a prerequisite.
One initial and obvious problem with process modelling in a distributed organization was that, despite the increasing investment in new technology, managerial work often involved working with various kinds of 'legacy' system. A legacy system is one which, having been introduced with the best of intentions as an 'all singing, all dancing' solution has not been maintained, modified or developed to accommodate organizational or technological change. In consequence the system is unlikely to do all that is required or 'talk' to more recent applications. This issue of legacy systems illustrates some of the difficulties of introducing and deploying technologies in organizations undergoing continuing and often significant change. In documenting the various 'workarounds' required of legacy systems -workarounds that may well defeat some of the objectives of process modellingthe observations point to a continuing and important facet of managerial work.
So, for example, the pharmacy system, crucial for process models in terms of the costing of drugs and treatment, was unable to talk to any of the other databases or management information systems, necessitating workarounds in the form of the printing of documents and multiple entry of data. Such legacy issues can arise relatively rapidly due to the fast changing nature of organizational priorities and organizational life, highlighting the way legacy issues are responsive to any changes in working circumstances and priorities. The paradox of such legacy systems is that, despite their outdated character, they are often trusted. Such systems are adhered to long after their usefulness has become limited, precisely because of the way in which they are embedded in longstanding social and organizational processes. Our observations indicated numerous legacy issues that impinged on the day-today practical organization of work for the managers whom we observed. The sites were not networked for any ICT purposes. Therefore, there were numerous problems with the current Management Information System (MIS) as the information section, which input all MIS data, could not directly access data from all three hospital sites within the Trust. Often it seemed impossible to get an accurate, up to date picture of any given situation such as waiting lists.
PROCESS MODELLING: IMPROVING 'KNIFE TO SKIN TIME'
An example of the effect of this kind of organizational problem came from the Directorate Manager of Orthopaedics (DMO)
q the stages in a particular process, for example, 'referrals placed in priority order' q prerequisites for a stage in a process, for example, 'clerical staff understand priority' q particular resources required, for example, 'secretaries' q potential blockages, for example, 'secretaries busy with other duties'.
This process modelling was central to one of her key roles: the monitoring of how efficiently patients were treated. She focused on how much activity was taking place in her directorate, in other words, how many patients were being treated. The DMO said she was keen on this exercise as it helped identify 'bottlenecks' in the medical process, for example, that CSR surgery didn't start until 10 a.m. In particular, she wanted to find out what she needed to do to get an earlier 'knife to skin' time.
In the discussions over the development of a process model for the new fracture clinic a number of issues arose. Some of these difficulties arise over inconsistencies in the process of documentation. For example, fracture patients will usually have been referred via A&E. However, whereas on first attendance at other departments the patients' details are entered on the Patient Administration System (PAS), this is not done uniformly across departments. A&E do not use the PAS but maintain a physical diary which has to be photocopied for the fracture clinic. There is also a problem of co-ordinating A&E records with the fracture clinic. When orthopaedic staff collect the patient list from the medical records department, medical records should have filled in details on a new file and should have also 'pulled' the case notes. The night staff, 40 Health Informatics Journal however, is not doing this. In a similar fashion, X-rays often go missing, because another department requires them.
The efficiency of the process model is also compromised by doctors not completing documentation, for example, not filling in requests for plastering -a patient could be left in the waiting room as the plasterer has not received a request and therefore doesn't know that the patient is waiting. Similarly, doctors using dictaphones to record further requirements for the secretaries to action are 'not staying within their process' because they sometimes 'miss' two or three patients. Finally, when secretaries go on annual leave there may be a two-or three-week backlog of untyped notes with the files remaining in the secretaries' office during this period rather than returned to medical records. In addition the secretaries need local knowledge in order to recognize the importance of particular test results, for example, a CT scan.
The DMO thus could not access up-todate information about waiting lists from the MIS information system. Furthermore, the information that was available did not really help to identify bottlenecks, i.e., the MIS information showed numbers of patients waiting but did not tell what the DMO calls 'the whole story'. For example, Trust 1 had a target maximum waiting list time of 13 weeks. The MIS data showed the percentage of patients for each consultant who had been waiting in excess of that time. This could be misleading, as in the case of spinal patients at Trust 1, where the MIS information showed that an apparently alarming 100 per cent were waiting more than 13 weeks for one particular consultant. On further investigation two things were discovered which accounted for this: first, only one patient was on the waiting list for that consultant; second, the consultant in question had left and his replacement was not yet in post. These instances from the MIS system highlight the importance of understanding organizational settings as a precursor to systems design [4] . They also show how trust in technology may be undermined in practice. To get a more accurate picture, the DMO used other forms of record, such as handwritten clinic records or spoke to relevant experts, such as clinic nurses. The DMO used the MIS information but did not trust it to 'tell the whole story'.
UNDERSTANDING THE WORK OF PROCESS MODELLING
One particularly important observation of the development of process models in the hospital is the ways in which process modelling becomes centrally implicated in activities of working towards achieving mutual relevances and co-ordination.
Members frequently drew upon ad hoc and wholly contingent interpretations and activities in order to arrive at an adequate representation of a particular flow of work. It is just these kinds of fine-grained, situated practices that are often missing from the ultimate process model. This recognition of what a process model will inevitably miss is not intended as a suggestion that process modelling is somehow without any efficacy. On the contrary, despite the ironies and the quips and the griping exhibited while doing it, members clearly did find some kind of purpose in doing all of this. A paramount achievement was, however, arrival at some kind of shared local appreciation, 'knowledge' one might say, of what a particular division of labour or process amounted to and the implicativeness of that. That is, process modelling in the hospital was noteworthy for the way in which it promoted 'knowledge' through co-ordination and arrival at a sense of mutual relevances, and understanding of 'how a place like this works'.
CONCLUSION
Underlying much of process modelling work is the notion that to achieve the prescription of a task everything must somehow be rendered uniform and predictable. This pursuit of uniformity manifests itself in numerous ways. One is the endeavour to standardize the format and methods for entering details into computer records so that the 'meaning' of such records could be rendered 'transparent', a goal visible in moves towards computer-based knowledge management. The problem, then, becomes effectively one of how to go about standardizing knowledge so that it could have a general applicability. Yet our observations of process modelling work makes it clear that any attempt to see expert knowledge as procedural is wholly unwarranted. Furthermore, a prime conception at play in this kind of process modelling is that it will ultimately prescribe a sequence of tasks that together make up a definitive version of best practice. However, the actual achievement of any process map makes it clear that all versions of best practice are negotiated products. The formulation of best practice is a situated affair -and process maps are, at heart, locally sensible versions of best practice. This is not to be read as any kind of criticism of the efficacy of such maps. Where they are both developed and used in the Improving 'knife to skin time' 41 same sets of local conditions many affordances may well accrue to such use. We suggest, however, that problems may arise where such locally sensible versions are exported throughout an organization to other settings where other relevances may apply. One significant finding here, then, is that process maps are not systematic, rational, scientific deductions of the most efficient process. Rather they are contingent objects of negotiation and experimentation among members who primarily attend to local, situated concerns and understandings that may well go beyond the narrow and abstracted conceptions of the task itself. Not only does following a process map involve arriving at the situated 'sense within the plan' [5] ; the making of such plans is an equally situated accomplishment. This is of significance for the realization of a range of planning activities throughout organizational life and their embedding in information systems. Increasing the fit between process model, system, user and organization needs to concern itself with the effective configuration and integration with work practices. As Berg argues:
Seeing that different tools can carry different logics, seeing how different tools reshape practices in different ways, opens the way to a much more fruitful strategy. Breaking away from having to either embrace formal tools or denounce them by shifting the terms of the debate creates new space, new leverage, and new potentials for intervention, comparison, preference, and maybe even choice… [6] 
